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INTRODUCTION
In the 2017 case Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 1 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the problem of racial bias in our justice system. The Court acknowledged
that racial discrimination, “odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.”2 The Court identified the jury as a criminal defendant’s
primary protection against racial prejudice.3 The Court stated that, based on this
principle, the justice system must identify methods to ferret out racial prejudice
among jurors. Otherwise, the integrity of the jury trial system will be compromised.
The Court noted that racial bias is a “familiar and recurring evil” that, if left
unchecked, “would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”4
The Pena-Rodriguez Court recognized several safeguards that are in place to
assist the trial court in identifying racial bias among jurors. These safeguards
include voir dire examination regarding racial bias, jury instructions addressing
racial bias, observation of juror demeanor and conduct that might demonstrate
racial bias, reports of racially biased comments or actions by jurors during trial, and
non-juror evidence of racial bias after trial.5 The Court acknowledged that these
safeguards may be insufficient at times and therefore added an additional one,
holding that the Sixth Amendment requires trial courts to review evidence
suggesting that racial bias was a motivating factor in a juror’s decision to convict a
criminal defendant even when the evidence of bias rears its head during otherwise
non-impeachable jury deliberations.6
This Article will demonstrate that the safeguards identified by the Court must
be improved if they are to assist trial courts in ferreting out juror bias. Social science
research has made clear that a majority of Americans carry some level of
subconscious or implicit bias against racial minorities and that this bias manifests
*
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itself in the application of racial stereotypes. These stereotypes can influence many
aspects of the jury’s functions. Until courts and legislatures are willing to craft
safeguards that will address the impact of bias head-on, the jury system will
continue to be infiltrated with bias.
I believe that the first step in ridding the jury system of racial bias is to tell the
truth about the prevalence and effect of bias. This includes naming the stereotypes
that are at play whenever a person of color enters a courtroom. Through honest,
open dialogue, which is a hallmark of the truth and reconciliation process, we can
begin to chip away at the justice system’s tradition of discrimination. I acknowledge
that these truths may make us uncomfortable, but the truth and reconciliation
process tells us that we can heal only after we have sat in the discomfort.
Section I of this Article will explore the prevalence and impact of racial bias
among jurors. This Section will review the social science research establishing that
bias, whether conscious or unconscious, affects the way we perceive those who are
different from us. This Section will also name many widely known stereotypes
about minorities and discuss how those stereotypes affect the jury’s core functions
of character assessment, witness credibility assessment, and fact interpretation and
recall. Section II will briefly review the facts of Pena-Rodriguez and discuss the
two preemptive safeguards that purportedly protect minorities from racial
discrimination in the courtroom. This Section will demonstrate that those two
safeguards, voir dire and jury instructions, are not universally available to criminal
defendants and, when used, are not always effective. Finally, Section III will detail
my proposals for improving voir dire and jury instructions in a way that places the
truth at the forefront and moves our system toward an open discussion of racial bias
in the courtroom.
I. THE PREVALENCE AND IMPACT OF RACIAL BIAS AMONG JURORS
Jurors, like other people,7 sometimes harbor racial and ethnic biases. Social
scientists and legal scholars have conducted research on the origins and
implications of juror bias. Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth have published
several studies on race and juries. 8 In 2003, they summarized two decades of
research on juror bias, finding that it supports the existence of White juror bias
against Black defendants and that this bias impacts jury decisions regarding Black
defendants’ guilt as well as sentencing recommendations.9 Sommers and Ellsworth
7

See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice
Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 739 (1995) (“Ethnic attitudes are a part of the social heritage of the
developing child. They are transmitted across generations as a component of the accumulated
knowledge of society. No person can grow up in a society without learning the prevailing attitudes
concerning the major ethnic groups.”).
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See generally Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know about
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(2003) (citing previous studies).
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also found that crime type impacts the likelihood of bias, concluding that jurors are
more likely to show racial bias when defendants are accused of crimes
stereotypically associated with their race. 10 They determined that “White jurors
viewed white-collar crimes––such as counterfeiting and embezzlement––as
consistent with a stereotype of White criminals. On the other hand, more violent
crimes such as assault and robbery were associated with a Black criminal
stereotype.” 11 Thus, a Black defendant who is accused of committing a
stereotypically violent crime is more likely to face racial bias. 12 Importantly,
Sommers and Ellsworth concluded that racial bias is not unique to White jurors.
Their research revealed that Black jurors are also affected by the race of the
defendant: “Compared to their judgments of the White defendant, Black jurors in
our study gave lower guilt ratings, shorter sentence recommendations, and more
positive personality evaluations to the Black defendant.”13
In 2015, Jennifer S. Hunt conducted a review of research dating back to 2005
and concluded that “the race and ethnicity of defendants, victims, and jurors can
impact the outcomes of criminal trials.”14 Hunt found that jurors in noncapital cases
tend to judge more harshly defendants from other racial or ethnic groups. 15
Additionally, she found that the race of the victim was significant in capital cases,
with jurors being more likely to recommend the death penalty when AfricanAmerican or Latino defendants are accused of killing White victims. 16 Hunt
theorized that victim race is significant in capital cases because jurors may reflect
on the value of the victim’s life when determining whether the death penalty is
appropriate.17
Racial bias among jurors may be explicit or implicit. Social scientists and legal
scholars define explicit biases as “attitudes and stereotypes that are consciously
accessible through introspection.” 18 Where explicit biases are socially accepted,
10
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Id.
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17
Id. Hunt’s theory implies that jurors assess greater value to the lives of White victims as compared
to the lives of Black victims.
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Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1124, 1132 (2012). The
authors define the term “attitude” as “an association between some concept (in this case a social
group) and an evaluative valence, either positive or negative.” Id. at 1128. They define a
“stereotype” as “an association between a concept (again, in this case a social group) and a trait.”
Id.
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individuals are likely to share them; however, where these biases are socially
unacceptable, they are more likely to remain hidden. 19 Implicit or unconscious
biases, on the other hand, are “attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously
accessible through introspection.”20
Many legal scholars have focused their research on enlightening the legal
community about the prevalence of implicit bias and offering solutions for how the
justice system can reduce or eliminate the impact of implicit bias.21 Michael Selmi
argues that the legal academy’s tendency to label bias as implicit actually limits the
liability of bad actors and gives them an excuse to continue their biased behavior.22
He points out that many well-known examples of implicit bias, such as the
hypothetical police officer who assumes that an African-American man is engaging
in criminal activity or the school principal who punishes misbehaving Black
children more harshly than similarly situated White students, actually demonstrate
intentionally discriminatory conduct that may be motivated by implicit attitudes.23
Selmi argues that legal scholars’ focus on the implicit nature of the attitudes rather
than the intentional nature of the conduct has had the effect of limiting legal liability
for intentional discrimination while also giving the biased actor an excuse of sorts.24
After all, the actor may feel blameless if it is true that we are all impacted by
subconscious biases that we cannot control.25 For this reason, Selmi encourages
scholars to adjust their narratives to a discussion of stereotypes rather than implicit
bias.26
Regardless of the level of awareness individuals have concerning their bias, it
is evident that racial and ethnic stereotypes are pervasive in American society.
Stereotypes are defined as “well-learned sets of associations among groups and
traits established in children's memories at an early age, before they have the
cognitive skills to decide rationally upon the personal acceptability of the
stereotypes.” 27 For example, a child might learn at an early age that AfricanAmericans are associated with crime or that Latinos are associated with illegal
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Id. at 223.
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Id.
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“stereotypes” interchangeably and stating, “[I]t is clear that, more often than not, what scholars
mean by implicit bias is that an individual is acting on an ingrained stereotype – associating African
Americans, for example, with criminality or women with children and a likelihood to leave the
workplace when they have children.”).
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Armour, supra note 7, at 741.
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immigration. 28 Although these associations develop when individuals are very
young, researchers have determined that adults rely upon stereotypes in very
specific situations. First, stereotypes significantly influence individuals who are not
motivated to seek individuating information about members of stereotyped
groups.29 Additionally, individuals who are under stress or who are pressed for time
are more likely to rely upon stereotypes. 30 Finally, as stated earlier, researchers
have found that jurors tend to make decisions based on stereotypes where the
defendant is accused of a crime that is “stereotypically associated” with the
defendant’s racial group and that jurors will punish these defendants more
severely.31
To fully understand racial stereotypes and their impact on jurors, it is necessary
to identify some of the most common stereotypes that a defendant of color may be
forced to contend with in court. In American society, race functions as a proxy for
an extensive list of characteristics. 32 We tend to associate people of color with
“undesirable personal qualities such as laziness, incompetence, and hostility, as
well as disfavored political viewpoints such as lack of patriotism or disloyalty to
the United States.”33 Researchers have found that biased individuals rely upon two
types of stereotypes: “They believe the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and
without control of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks), or they
believe the out-group is pushy, ambitious, conniving, and in control of business,
money, and industry (a typical accusation against Jews).”34
N. Jeremi Duru argues that stereotypes about Black men are a part of the
Charles Lawrence III has theorized that although stereotypes are “tacitly transmitted,” they
nevertheless influence our decisions: “If an individual has never known a black doctor or lawyer or
is exposed to blacks only through a mass media where they are portrayed in the stereotyped roles of
comedian, criminal, musician, or athlete, he is likely to deduce that blacks as a group are naturally
inclined toward certain behavior and unfit for certain roles. But the lesson is not explicit: It is
learned, internalized, and used without an awareness of its source.” The Id, the Ego and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 343 (1987).
29
Melinda Jones, Preventing the Application of Stereotypic Biases in the Courtroom: The Role of
Detailed Testimony, 20 J. OF APP. SOC. PSY. 1767, 1768 (1997) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (stating that “stereotypes operate as simplifying heuristics that exert a greater influence
when individuals are either insufficiently motivated to seek accurate impressions or when their
information processing abilities are taxed.”).
30
Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1013, 1071-72 (2004) (“[T]he perceiver may be under too much stress or too busy to do much
more than rely on cognitive and behavioral shortcuts. People who are aroused or under greater
cognitive load may rely more heavily on expectations and stereotypes. . . . Time pressures also limit
the ability and motivation of both parties to avoid stereotype confirmation.”).
31
Sommers and Ellsworth, supra note 8, at 1007-08. See also Jones, supra note 29, at 1768 (stating
that “preexisting beliefs about the defendant’s social group may affect judgments of culpability and
predictions of future criminal behavior, particularly if the crime is stereotypically linked to the
defendant’s social group” and finding that jurors’ use of stereotypes resulted in more severe
recommended sentences).
32
Wang, supra note 30, at 1013.
33
Id. at 1014.
34
Lawrence, supra note 28, at 333 (citing studies).
28
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American tradition. 35 He identifies a set of inter-related but unsubstantiated
stereotypes as the myth of the Bestial Black Man, a myth “deeply imbedded in
American culture, that black men are animalistic, sexually unrestrained, inherently
criminal, and ultimately bent on rape.” 36 Duru traces the origins of the myth to
slavery. Slaveholders justified the institution of slavery by perpetuating a belief that
Black slaves were nonhuman.37 Additionally, Duru argues that slavery itself was
the basis for the stereotype that Blacks are criminals because “the assertion of the
most basic human right, liberty, was, for the slave, criminal.”38 Indeed, he notes
that slaveholders lived in constant fear of slave rebellions and that this fear caused
them to heavily scrutinize the actions of slaves.39 Duru theorizes that the stereotype
concerning the super-sexuality of Black men also finds its origins in slavery. He
notes that slaveholders feared the sexual potency of Black men and believed that
Black men “would, whenever possible, rape white women.”40 Duru argues that the
myth of the Bestial Black Man survived the end of slavery and has continued to
persevere in modern American life.41
Stereotypes concerning the characteristics and behavior of Black women
similarly date back to slavery and continue to persist today. Scholars have identified
(and named) a set of stereotypes traditionally attributed to African-American
women:
First, Mammy, everyone's favorite aunt or grandmother, sometimes
referred to as “Aunt Jemima,” is ready to soothe everyone's hurt,
envelop them in her always ample bosom, and wipe away their tears.
She is often even more nurturing to her white charges than to her
35

N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black
Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004).
36
Id. at 1320. Accord Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial
and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 573 n.5 (1993)
(“The unfortunate truth is that historically in our society, black men have been portrayed as a people
to be feared; savages, unable to be tamed.”).
37
Duru, supra note 35, at 1322. See also Montré D. Carodine, “The Mis-Characterization of the
Negro”: A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 532 (2009)
(“[T]o justify their enslavement of Blacks and the harsher treatment of Blacks in the criminal justice
system, White slave owners and legislators constructed a mischaracterization of Blacks using
multiple negative stereotypes. Among other things, Blacks were characterized as being lazy,
unclean, dishonest, ignorant, and violent. The common denominator with all of the stereotypes was
that they reinforced the idea of the Black person as inferior to the White person.”).
38
Duru, supra note 35, at 1323. See also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402-03 (1996) (describing the
prevalence of the Black-as-criminal stereotype and stating, “One of the stereotypes most often
applied to African American males is that they are more dangerous, more prone to violence, and
more likely to be criminals or gang members than other members of society.”).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 1324. Duru notes that “[i]n the minds of many whites, the very existence of the black man
in America, conceived to be animalistic, sexually predatory, and criminal by nature, presented a
ubiquitous threat of rape.” Id.
41
Id. at 1346.
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own children. Next, there is Jezebel, the bad-black-girl, who is
depicted as alluring and seductive as she either indiscriminately
mesmerizes men and lures them into her bed, or very deliberately
lures into her snares those who have something of value to offer her.
Finally, Sapphire, the wise-cracking, balls-crushing, emasculating
woman, is usually shown with her hands on her hips and her head
thrown back as she lets everyone know she is in charge.42
In addition to these commonly known stereotypes of Black women, scholars have
identified two others that are at play in contemporary American society: (1) the
“Matriarch,” described as “the Mammy gone bad” who spends too much time aware
from the home, fails to properly supervise her children, emasculates the men in her
life, and is overly aggressive;43 and (2) the “Welfare Queen,” a woman who refuses
gainful employment and bears several children who are “a threat to [the country’s]
economic stability.”44 These stereotypes contribute to a common perception that
Black women are “untrustworthy, criminal, or dangerous.”45
Although the focus of much of this Article is racial bias against AfricanAmericans, it is important to note that American society imposes stereotypes on
other people of color and that the imposition of these stereotypes can impact their
ability to receive a fair trial. Cynthia Lee identifies several commonly held
stereotypes regarding Asian-American and Latino people, such as: (1) Asian as
model minority stereotype, (2) Asian as foreigner stereotype, (3) Asian as martial
artist stereotype, (4) Latino as foreigner stereotype, and (5) Latino as criminal
stereotype.46 Lee notes that while the Asian as model minority stereotype may be
beneficial to Asians, “the positive attributes of the model minority stereotype (e.g.,
intelligent, hardworking, law-abiding) are linked with corresponding negative
attributes (e.g., lacking personality, unfairly competitive, clannish, unwilling to
assimilate, rigidly rule-bound).” 47 She argues that each of these stereotypes,
including the model minority stereotype, can have a negative impact on jurors
considering whether it was reasonable for a defendant to use deadly force against a
person of color.48 In post-9/11 America, Arab-Americans have been stereotyped as
Marilyn Yarbrough and Crystal Bennett, Cassandra and the “Sistahs”: The Peculiar Treatment
of African-American Women in the Myth of Women as Liars, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 625, 63536 (2000).
43
Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The
African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1051
n.174.
44
Id. at 1051 n.175.
45
Lee, supra note 38, at 403.
46
Id. at 423-52.
47
Id. at 426.
48
Id. at 499-500. Accord Jody D. Armour, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 3-4 (1997) (stating that a defendant in a self-defense case could
argue that the victim’s race is relevant on the issue of reasonableness in that widely known racial
stereotypes might influence a defendant’s belief that she is about to be attacked).
42
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disloyal and imminently threatening terrorists.49 As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council
on American-Islamic Relations stated, “The common stereotypes are that we're all
Arabs, we're all violent and we're all conducting a holy war.”50
Because racial and ethnic stereotypes are part and parcel of American culture,
our justice system must do more to ensure that jury verdicts are not influenced by
stereotyped beliefs. The rules of evidence should recognize the value that jurors are
very likely to place on the race of a party or witness.51 Instead, they work in the
opposite manner in that they “do not acknowledge the evidentiary value of race but
at the same time often operate in a manner that perpetuates and increases the
probative value and prejudicial effect of race.”52
Racial bias, through the application of stereotypes, can have a very practical
impact on the way in which jurors view and assess evidence at trial. This Section
will highlight studies addressing the impact of stereotypes on the following the
following types of evidence: (1) character assessment, (2) witness credibility
assessment, and (3) fact interpretation and recall.
A. Stereotypes and Character Assessment
“I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they
want. Nine times out of ten Mexican men are guilty of being aggressive toward
women and young girls.”53
At trial, jurors are often called upon to assess character. While the Federal
Rules of Evidence54 generally prohibit parties from introducing character evidence
to show propensity, 55 criminal defendants may introduce evidence of their own
relevant character traits or the character traits of their alleged victim, 56 and the
government may respond with its own evidence in rebuttal. 57 Additionally, in
homicide cases, the government may offer evidence of an alleged victim’s character
for peacefulness to rebut defendant’s claim that the alleged victim was the first
49

Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of
Arab Americans As "Terrorists", 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001).
50
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Saito notes that even though Arabs come from many different
religious backgrounds and many members of the Muslim faith are not Arab, “these distinctions are
blurred and negative images about either Arabs or Muslims are often attributed to both.” Id.
51
Carodine, supra note 37, at 536.
52
Id.
53
This statement was allegedly made by one juror during deliberations in the Pena-Rodriguez
matter. Pena-Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 862.
54
Forty-four states, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the military have adopted codes
modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Notes,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2018).
55
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.”).
56
Criminal defendants may offer evidence of an alleged victim’s character traits subject to the
limitations of the rape shield law. Id.
57
Id.
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aggressor.58 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide parties with greater leeway if
their purpose for introducing character evidence is something other than to show
that an individual has a propensity to behave in a certain way. 59 The Rules allow
parties to civil and criminal actions to introduce evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act, often referred to as “prior bad acts” or “uncharged acts,” when offered
for a purpose other than to show propensity.60 A proper purpose for such evidence
might include “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”61
The rules of evidence encourage trial courts to consider proffered character
evidence with a heavy dose of skepticism, for, as the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee noted, placing character evidence before a jury is quite risky:
Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very
prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of
what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the
trier of fact to reward the good man [and] to punish the bad man because
of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows
actually happened.62
Despite the Advisory Committee’s efforts to implement a process that would force
trial courts to properly scrutinize character evidence before it is introduced to the
jury, prosecutors and defense attorneys routinely place covert, implicit race-based
character evidence before juries.63 Because such evidence is subliminal, playing
upon the jury’s most deep-seated prejudices, it escapes review from the trial court.64

58

Id.
FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
60
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
61
Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence also allow parties to offer evidence proving a witness’ character
for truthfulness. These rules will be discussed in Section I.B., infra.
62
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note (internal quotations omitted).
63
See Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 321, 334-35
(2015) (theorizing that implicit bias, white-specific behavioral expectations for people of color, and
long-held racial stereotypes combine to create “affirmative character evidence that jurors will
consider in criminal cases involving African-Americans”). See also Carodine, supra note 37, at 530
(“Though the rules of evidence have adopted a general policy against the use of character evidence,
they do not really account for or address the more subtle ways that character evidence is introduced
to the jury. . . . A particularly difficult and troubling subset of this issue of informal character
assessment by the jury is how jurors perceive the race of parties and other participants in the trial.
Jurors, of course, come from the real world where race does matter.”).
64
Blackness as Character Evidence, supra note 63, at 335 (“This evidence of stereotypical
Blackness is introduced to jurors outside the confines of Rule 404(a). Thus, courts are not required
to engage in any analysis of whether the prejudice associated with the evidence, if any, might result
in an unfair outcome.”).
59
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Historically, trial courts sanctioned prosecutors’ explicit attempts to introduce
race-based character evidence as proof of a criminal defendant’s guilt. 65 These
explicit attempts to introduce race included arguments based on racial
stereotypes. 66 Duru describes a 1919 Mississippi rape case involving a Black
defendant where a prosecutor made the following statement during his closing
argument: “Ah! It is nothing now days [sic] and not uncommon to pick up a paper
and see where some brute has committed this crime. . . . You see it South, North,
and East, where a brute of his race has committed this fiendish crime.”67 Although
the defendant’s attorney objected to this statement, the trial court failed to make a
ruling, and the jury later convicted the defendant.68
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that race-based
prosecutorial arguments violate the Constitution;69 however, many reported cases
detail the practice.70 Citing numerous federal cases published between 1968 and
2001, Demetria Frank has found that “prosecutors often make overt and improper
racial references based on the victim or defendant's race, likely triggering juror
racial biases and stereotypes.”71 Frank notes that while appellate courts generally
find this prosecutorial conduct to be improper, they rarely overturn the defendant’s
conviction, often finding no prejudicial impact when the statement is balanced
against the weight of the other evidence offered against the defendant.72
In the 2013 case Calhoun v. United States, the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to weigh in on a prosecutor’s inappropriate reference to race, but it
failed to grant certiorari to the defendant who sought to have his conviction
65

Duru, supra note 35, at 1331 (quoting Pumphrey v. State, an Alabama Supreme Court case, which
held that “social customs, founded on race differences,” and the fact that an alleged rape victim was
white and the defendant Black, could properly be considered when determining defendant’s intent
(156 Ala. 103, 107-08 (1908)). Accord Jackson v. State, 18 S.E. 132, 133 (Ga. 1893) (“Surely it was
legitimate for the jury to note any departure from the customary modes of visiting which was
involved in a nocturnal entrance by a negro man into the bedroom of a white woman during the
hours usually devoted to sleep.”); Richardson v. State, 123 So. 283, 284 (Ala. Ct. App. 1929) (“What
would be a caress or a mere assault as between persons of the same or similar social standing would
become of much graver moment as between persons of a different social status and of different
races.”).
66
Duru, supra note 35, at 1332 (noting that, historically, attorneys’ comments often reinforced the
stereotype of Black men as inherently criminal).
67
Id. (quoting Garner v. State, 83 So. 83, 83 (Miss. 1919)).
68
Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned defendant’s conviction, finding that the
prosecutor’s statement “appealed to racial prejudice and Southern sentiment” and may have had a
strong impact on the jury. Id. at 83-84.
69
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 n. 30 (1987) (“The Constitution prohibits racially biased
prosecutorial arguments.”).
70
See Demetria D. Frank, The Proof is in the Prejudice: Implicit Bias, Uncharged Acts Evidence &
the Colorblind Courtroom, 32 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 24 (2016).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 25. Frank also notes that the abuse of discretion standard of review allows the appellate
court to overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling only where the ruling was “arbitrary and
irrational.” Id. Frank theorizes that appellate court judges are unlikely to make such a finding if they
do not fully grasp that a prosecutor’s improper reference to race can trigger juror bias. Id.
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overturned because of the reference.73 In Calhoun, an African-American defendant
was charged with participating in a drug conspiracy. 74 Although Calhoun’s friend
testified that Calhoun was aware of a plan to complete a drug transaction, Calhoun
testified that he had no knowledge of his friend’s plan to purchase drugs.75 During
Calhoun’s cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned him regarding
his intent.76 At one point during cross-examination, the prosecutor stated, “You've
got African–Americans, you've got Hispanics, you've got a bag full of money. Does
that tell you—a light bulb doesn't go off in your head and say, This is a drug deal?”77
Defense counsel did not object to the question but addressed the prosecutor’s racial
reference during closing arguments.78 During the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument,
he stated to the jury:
I got accused by [defense counsel] of, I guess, racially, ethnically
profiling people when I asked the question of Mr. Calhoun, Okay, you got
African–American[s] and Hispanics, do you think it's a drug deal? But
there's one element that's missing. The money. So what are they doing in
this room with a bag full of money? What does your common sense tell
you that these people are doing in a hotel room with a bag full of money,
cash? None of these people are Bill Gates or computer [magnates]? None
of them are real estate investors.79
Although the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari on Calhoun’s petition,
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, published a statement that denounced
the prosecutor’s race-based references.80 Sotomayor stated that the Court’s denial
of Calhoun’s petition should not be read to indicate the Court’s tolerance for the
prosecutor’s statements. 81 She indicated that the prosecutor’s statements were
obviously improper and at odds with Supreme Court precedent. According to
Sotomayor, “[b]y suggesting that race should play a role in establishing a
defendant's criminal intent, the prosecutor here tapped a deep and sorry vein of
racial prejudice that has run through the history of criminal justice in our Nation.”82
Indeed, Sotomayor identified the prosecutor’s statements as an obvious attempt to
convince jurors “to substitute racial stereotype for evidence, and racial prejudice
for reason.”83
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While courts have addressed the government’s explicit attempts to
introduce race-based character evidence to jurors, they have done little to eliminate
implicit or subliminal race-based character evidence. Social science research has
revealed that even the most basic racial cues during trial can trigger the application
of stereotypes and impact how jurors assess the evidence before them.84 On the
basis of this research, legal scholars have theorized that when attorneys reference
animal imagery in describing people of color and Black men in particular, they
trigger commonly held stereotypes and prejudices.85 Thus, referring to people of
color as “animals in the jungle,” “mad dogs,” or “laughing hyenas” might impact a
juror’s assessment of a defendant’s character. 86 Scholars have identified other
“racial code words” that trigger stereotypes. Carodine argues that a prosecutor’s
references to Black defendants as “they” or “them” signal to jurors that Blacks are
inherently different from Whites and “generally outliers in the moral, civilized, and
law-abiding society to which the jurors themselves belong.”87 Carodine cites State
v. Henderson, 88 a Minnesota case, as an example of a prosecutor’s attempt to
“other”89 the Black defense witnesses who testified before the jury. In Henderson,
the prosecution argued to the jury, “[T]he people that are involved in this world are
not people from your world. Their experiences, their lifestyles are totally foreign to
all of you. These are not your world. These are the Defendant's people. They are
his friends.”90 On appeal, the defendant argued that this statement demonstrated the
government’s attempt to appeal to the jury’s passions and prejudices, but the
prosecution denied that the statement had anything to do with the race of the
witnesses.91 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s statement
did not constitute misconduct nor was the comment so prejudicial that it denied
defendant his right to a fair trial.92 It is important to note that defense attorneys also
utilize racial code words and specific imagery in self-defense cases involving
African-Americans.93
The subtle race-based references and imagery often introduced at trial are
identical to the propensity evidence that courts routinely exclude pursuant to the
84
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rules of evidence. Just as propensity evidence might prime a jury to find that an
individual acted in conformity with past behavior, race-coded language might
prime a jury to find that an individual acted in conformity with widely known
stereotypes about the individual’s racial or ethnic group. Despite the obvious
similarities between these two types of character evidence, the rules of evidence are
only equipped to address the former.
B. Stereotypes and Witness Credibility Assessment
“I don’t believe defendant’s alibi witness. After all, he’s an illegal.”94
As a part of their fact-finding role, jurors must assess whether witnesses are
providing truthful testimony. As the Supreme Court has noted, one of the jury’s
core functions is to make credibility determinations, in essence operating as a lie
detector.95 The justice system leaves this important function to the jury based on
the presumption that jurors are “fitted for it by their natural intelligence and their
practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.”96 Recognizing the importance
of the jury’s function as a “lie detector,” several rules of evidence focus on witness
credibility and impeachment. Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 609, and 613 address
the manner in which witnesses may be impeached,97 and Rule 608 regulates the
manner in which evidence concerning a witness’ character for truthfulness may be
introduced to the jury.98
Although jurors serve as the chief lie detectors during trial, studies demonstrate
that jurors, like other people, are not very good at lie detection. According to Joseph
Rand, who reviewed more than thirty years of research on lie detection, “most
observers in controlled studies detect deception about as well as a flipped coin,
because they focus on ‘cues’ to deception derived from folklore and common
sense––such as the speaker’s inability to maintain a steady gaze––that are often
more a sign of discomfort than deception.” 99 Rand theorizes that jurors may be
worse at lie detection than the subjects participating in the controlled studies
because trial witnesses will likely be better prepared.100 Rand concludes that jurors
“are likely to be regularly misled by a deceitful witness or mistakenly distrustful of
the truthful one.”101
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Racial bias and stereotypes create even more risk that jurors will make
mistakes in their efforts to assess witness credibility. Rand argues that a “demeanor
gap” exists when jurors of one race are called upon to assess the credibility and
demeanor of a witness of a different race.102 He posits that well-intentioned and
low-prejudiced jurors “will be unable to dependably judge the demeanor of a
witness of a different race because they are unable to accurately decipher the cues
that the witness uses to communicate sincerity.”103 Before reviewing the specific
ways in which racial bias and stereotypes can impact credibility assessment in the
modern American courtroom, it is important to consider the historical relevance of
race on the question of a witness’ credibility.
Prior to the abolition of slavery, the law generally prohibited slaves from
testifying against Whites.104 This prohibition was enforced in southern and northern
states alike. 105 Similarly, laws in states including New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia precluded free Blacks from testifying against Whites.106 Once the Civil
War ended, Congress passed a law that forbade the state from depriving citizens of
their right to file suit, act as parties to a suit, or provide evidence.107 Even though
this law ended the official exclusion of Black witnesses, for much of the twentieth
century, attorneys frequently argued that juries should discount or ignore the
testimony of Black witnesses. As a part of her research on the topic of race and
witness credibility, Sheri Lynn Johnson reviewed several pre-Civil Rights Era
prosecutorial misconduct cases and found two patterns of racially biased attorney
arguments concerning credibility. In the first pattern, attorneys argued that Black
witnesses were inherently less trustworthy because of their race while the second
pattern involved attorneys arguing that Black witnesses should not be believed
because Blacks are inclined to lie for each other.108 Johnson also found a case where
prosecutors made similar arguments about Chinese witnesses testifying on behalf
of a Chinese-American defendant. 109 Importantly, Johnson found that these
patterns have continued, and she cites to several modern cases where prosecutors
have explicitly argued that a witness’ race should impact the jury’s assessment of
102
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his or her credibility.110 These reported cases have led Johnson to conclude that race
continues to serve as a proxy for credibility.111
To the extent race impacts credibility assessments, it often occurs in more
subtle, subconscious ways. Indeed, well-intentioned jurors may be completely
unaware that stereotypes and bias are at play as they judge the truthfulness of trial
witnesses. 112 Many prosecutors have abandoned explicit race-based credibility
arguments in light of appellate courts’ disfavor for such arguments,113 but they have
replaced them with indirect jibes that chip away at the witness’ credibility. Johnson
notes that prosecutors use an array of tactics, including “racial epithets, animal
imagery, and the practice of referring to a minority race witness by her first name,”
thereby triggering multiple racial stereotypes.114
Researchers have identified specific stereotypes that likely come into play
when African-Americans serve as witnesses. They include:
(1)

(2)

(3)

the stereotype that African-Americans are less intelligent than
Whites, which would be invoked if the Black witnesses were called
upon to recall and describe events accurately;
the stereotype that African-Americans are not trustworthy and
honest, which would have obvious implications for any sort of trial
testimony; and
the stereotype that African-Americans are violent, such that any
allegation regarding violence would be bolstered by its consistency
with the stereotype.115
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These stereotypes impact jurors in various ways. Rand describes the first such
phenomenon as “skepticism bias.” 116 According to Rand, jurors tend to be less
suspicious and are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to witnesses who share
their identity, but they are more suspicious of witnesses who do not share their
identity.117 White jurors in particular begin the credibility assessment process with
an “innate suspicion” of Black witnesses.118 Even Whites who have low levels of
prejudice may see facts in a particular way because racial stereotypes have a strong,
albeit subconscious, influence on how they perceive events.119 Rand has found that
jurors who are more influenced by racial stereotypes are likely to be more
suspicious of African-American witnesses.120 This higher level of skepticism will
cause jurors to “focus more closely on certain deception cues and become more
skeptical. They will skew their credibility determinations against not only deceptive
African American witnesses, but honest ones as well.”121
Racial stereotypes also have greater influence over jurors when they hear
stereotype-consistent testimony because individuals who are impacted by
stereotypes do a better job of processing stereotype-consistent information as
compared to stereotype-inconsistent information.122 As Johnson explains, “To the
extent that a witness––of any race––testifies to behavior that conforms to a racial
stereotype of the purported actor, such conformity may enhance that witness’
credibility.” 123 Johnson notes that stereotypes concerning violence or sexual
behavior are particularly corroborative of a witness’ testimony.124 Thus, a racial
stereotype regarding the sexual proclivities or super-sexuality of Black men might
work to corroborate the testimony of a White woman who says a Black man raped
her. Rand has found that the opposite is true as well––where witness testimony is
stereotype-inconsistent, jurors who are impacted by racial stereotypes will find this
testimony to be less credible. He posits that individuals will ignore information that
is inconsistent with their expectations.125 Therefore, “if a white juror has developed
a [belief] that African-American men act a certain way, she will more easily process
information that is consistent with that stereotype and disregard information that is
inconsistent.”126
116
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Racial stereotypes also assist counsel in indirectly discrediting a witness by
identifying the witness as the “other.” “Othering” is defined as “a process by which
individuals and society view and label people who are different in a way that
devalues them.” 127 When individuals engage in “othering,” they determine that
certain people are “not us,” and that determination functions to create a devalued
and dehumanized Other, and a distancing of the other from ourselves.”128 Scholars
theorize that lawyers who can successfully “other” a witness will be able to hurt the
witness’ credibility. Carodine argues that Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which
allows for the admission of prior criminal convictions to impeach the testimony of
a witness, 129 is especially harmful to Black defendant-witnesses because it
reinforces the widely known Blacks-as-criminals stereotype and allows for the
“othering” of the defendant-witness.130 She argues that a prosecutor can “other” the
defendant-witness with a prior conviction by “draw[ing] a line around the
defendant, locating both herself and her audience on the same opposite of that line–
–thereby defining the attorney as a trustworthy member of the jurors'
community.”131
The State of Florida v. Zimmerman trial offers a helpful example of an
attorney’s attempt to “other” a witness using racial stereotypes. Zimmerman was
charged with second-degree murder in the killing of a seventeen-year-old Black
male named Trayvon Martin.132 Zimmerman claimed that he killed Martin in selfdefense.133 The prosecution’s key witness was a nineteen-year-old Black woman
named Rachel Jeantel. Jeantel was Martin’s friend and the last person to speak with
127
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him before his death.134 Jeantel provided key testimony for the prosecution despite
her reluctance to testify, but some commentators perceived defense counsel’s crossexamination of Jeantel to be “abusive” because the attorney’s tone was harsh and
“the questioning at times, subtly (or not so subtly, depending on your viewpoint)
implied that Ms. Jeantel was unintelligent and thus not credible.”135 Jeantel also
struggled to read the transcript of her deposition testimony, which defense counsel
provided to her during cross-examination, and she later admitted that she had some
literacy difficulties. 136 Jeantel’s testimony, like the entire Zimmerman trial, was
televised, and social media reacted swiftly with criticism of Jeantel for being
stereotypically Black––uneducated, hostile, inarticulate, angry toward Whites,
lazy, and a thug. 137 Thus, Zimmerman’s defense counsel was successful in
“othering” Jeantel. As Carodine stated, “The message that Zimmerman's lawyer,
Don West, sent the court, the jury, and the (white) public was that ‘she looked
different, sounded different, shit she must be lying because she sure as hell ain't one
of us.’”138
Finally, racial stereotypes impact witness credibility where a party offers crossracial corroborative testimony. This phenomenon is a corollary to the stereotype
that people of color are willing to lie for each other. Where a party offers
corroborating testimony from an individual of a different race, well-intentioned
fact-finders may automatically determine that witness’ testimony to be more
credible. The Supreme Court fell victim to this phenomenon in Schlup v. Delo.139
Schlup, a White man who was sentenced to death following a murder conviction,
filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that his constitutional rights were
violated when certain evidence that would have proven his innocence was withheld
from the jury.140 At the time of the murder, Schlup was an inmate in a Missouri
penitentiary, and he and two other inmates were charged with killing a Black
inmate. 141 While the Supreme Court spent much of its time considering the
appropriate review standard, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, referenced
some of the affidavits submitted by Schlup to establish his innocence.142 The Court
specifically quoted the affidavit of Lamont Griffin Bey and identified Bey as
Black.143 Bey’s affidavit stated that Schlup was not involved in the murder.144 Sheri
Lynn Johnson argues that Stevens quoted Bey’s affidavit because he found Bey to
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be especially credible due of his race:145
The Court may be implying that any time a Black person testifies
for a white person, that testimony is more likely to be true. If so,
then more likely than what? More likely than if a Black person
testifies for a Black person? More likely than if a white person
testifies for a white person? Perhaps the inference is narrower: when
a Black prisoner testifies for a white prisoner, that testimony is more
likely to be true. If so, again, more likely than what?146
If highly intelligent, well-trained jurists can fall prey to the stereotype that crossracial corroborating testimony is more credible than intra-racial corroborating
testimony, then jurors are very likely to buy into the same stereotype.
This Section has highlighted the various ways in which racial stereotypes can
impact a jury’s assessment of witness credibility often outside an individual juror’s
conscious awareness. What is missing from this discussion is a description of the
tools available to address the problem. Because the phenomena described above are
quite different from the explicit race-based credibility arguments of the past, our
justice system is not equipped to address them. As Johnson notes, “The information
that we have about racial stereotypes and about modern forms and manifestations
of prejudice suggests that the silent––and sometimes even subconscious––
inferences of jurors will often be tainted racial generalizations, yet the influence of
such inferences on jurors is not subject to challenge through any existing legal
mechanism.”147
C. Stereotypes, Fact Interpretation, and Recall
As fact-finders, jurors must go about interpreting the facts put before them, a
task that is heavily influenced by each juror’s life experiences. Lee has found that
“decision-makers actively construct representations of the trial evidence based on
their prior expectations about what constitutes an adequate explanation of the
litigated event. These representations, rather than the original ‘raw’ evidence, form
the basis of the juror’s final decision.”148 The justice system encourages jurors to
rely upon their personal experiences when weighing evidence and interpreting
facts. 149 Moreover, the system acknowledges that allowing jurors to enter the
deliberation room with their unique life experiences makes the fact-finding process
145
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both human and imperfect.150 As the New York Court of Appeals has described,
jurors bring very valuable experiences to the process: “Nor would we want a jury
devoid of life experience, even if that were possible, because it is precisely such
experience that enables a jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the
strength of arguments.”151
While I agree that jurors’ individual life experiences certainly provide them
with helpful insight at times, I am troubled by the possibility that one’s life
experiences and understanding of the world may include some racial and ethnic
stereotypes. This Section will explore two distinct but related areas where the jury’s
fact-finding function can be influenced by racial bias and stereotypes: the
interpretation of ambiguous facts and fact recall.
1. Ambiguous Facts
At the outset, it is important to explain what I mean by “ambiguous facts.” A
fact scenario is ambiguous when the participants’ intentions are not obvious and
their actions can be interpreted in multiple, divergent ways. Legal scholars have
argued that where holes exist in the prosecution’s case, jurors tend to “fill in the
gaps” or “complete the story” by turning to racial stereotypes.152 In fact, where the
prosecution’s case is especially weak, jurors are more likely to rely on their life
experiences, including their racial biases, to make their decisions. 153 Jurors’
inclination to interpret ambiguous behavior in this manner results from “the general
tendency of observers to interpret the ambiguous behavior of another person in
accordance with the observer's expectations.”154
Legal scholars can find support for their arguments in the social science
literature. In one study, Patricia Devine presented a set of ambiguous facts to
participants after priming them with stereotypes of African-Americans. 155 She
quickly flashed words to study participants, including “poor,” “athletic,” and
“Black,” and then asked them to read a story about a Black person who “demands
his money back from a store clerk immediately after a purchase and refuses to pay
his rent until his apartment is repainted.”156 Once the participants completed the
story, Devin asked them to make judgments about the person. She found that the
priming had a direct impact on the participant’s judgments. Participants who were
150
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primed with more stereotypes judged the person’s ambiguous behavior more
harshly than participants who were primed with fewer stereotypes.157 The study
demonstrated that subliminal priming “affected the way participants later judged
the hostility of African-Americans in racially stereotyped ways.” 158 Other
researchers have found that the Blacks-as-criminals stereotype caused study
participants to see weapons where none actually existed and to classify identical
facial expressions as more hostile or threatening on Black faces as compared to
White faces.159
In the 1970s, Birt Duncan conducted a study to test his theory that study
subjects would interpret ambiguously hostile behavior differently based on the race
of the actor. The participants, who were all White, observed a scenario where two
people, either Black or White, got into a heated argument that resulted in Actor A
shoving Actor B. Participants were asked to rate the behavior of Actor A.160 Duncan
found that the participants judged Actor A much more harshly depending on his
race:
White university subjects perceived the "somewhat ambiguous,"
certainly less than blatant shove as violent (and labeled it thusly) for
all conditions in which the black was the harm-doer, to a greater
extent when the victim is white, but also when the victim was
another black. Aggressive behavior, dramatizing, playing around,
and so on (any category but violent behavior) were the labels applied
when the harm-doer was white, even if the victim was a black or
another white. Support was found for the hypothesis that the
threshold for labeling an act as violent is lower when viewing a
black committing the same act.161
Duncan concluded that his findings could have real-world consequences for Blacks
who have been accused of violence and whose fate could be decided by eyewitness
testimony.162
In a more recent study, Laurie Rudman and Matthew Lee tested whether
violent, misogynistic rap lyrics would have an impact on study participants’
interpretation of Black and White actors. 163 Study subjects, who were told they
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were participating in a marketing study, listened to rap music for the first part of
the study. Researchers caused the audio player to stop working during the sixth rap
song. Participants were then told that the study had been discontinued due to the
player’s malfunction but that they could satisfy their obligation to participate in a
study by completing a questionnaire on “person perception.”164 Study subjects then
read a story about a man engaging in ambiguously sexist behavior such as refusing
to tip a female server or refusing to let a female door-to-door salesperson inside his
house. In half of the stories, the man’s name was Donald and in the other half the
man’s name was Kareem.165 Rudman and Lee theorized that the participants would
assume Donald to be White and Kareem to be Black. Participants were asked to
rate the man’s level of hostility, sexism, and intelligence.166 Rudman and Lee found
that subjects who were primed with rap music were more likely to judge Kareem
as more hostile, more sexist, and less intelligent than Donald and that these
judgments did not correlate with the participants’ prejudice levels. 167 The
researchers’ finding regarding prejudice levels suggests that even low-prejudiced
and non-prejudiced individuals “may succumb to the influence of implicit
stereotypes and prejudice when they interpret and judge social behavior.” 168
Moreover, if jurors’ racial stereotypes are triggered, perhaps even en route to the
courthouse,169 then African-American defendants could suffer the consequences.
Finally, in a study conducted by Justin Levinson and Danielle Young,
participants read a one-paragraph description of an armed robbery and then viewed
five photographs of the crime and crime scene.170 One of the photos showed an
armed gunman who was wearing a mask but whose forearms were exposed. The
skin tone of the gunman was manipulated, with some participants viewing a photo
of a dark-skinned gunman while others viewed a photo of a lighter-skinned
gunman.171 The photos were identical other than the difference in skin tone. The
participants then evaluated twenty pieces of evidence. Some of the evidence
suggested that the defendant charged in the case may be innocent (e.g., the
defendant had a used movie ticket stub for a show that started twenty minutes
before the robbery occurred), while other evidence suggested that defendant was
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guilty (e.g., the store owner identified defendant’s voice in an audio line-up).172
The participants also reviewed some ambiguous evidence (e.g., defendant was seen
shopping at the store two days prior to the robbery). 173 After evaluating the
evidence, participants were asked to determine whether the defendant was guilty or
not guilty on a 100-point scale.174 Levinson and Young found that the skin tone of
the defendant “significantly affected” the evidence judgments.175 They determined
that “[p]articipants who saw the photo of the perpetrator with a dark skin tone
judged ambiguous evidence to be significantly more indicative of guilt than
participants who saw the photo of a perpetrator with a lighter skin tone.” 176
Additionally, the study subjects who saw a darker-skinned perpetrator judged the
defendant to be more guilty on the 100-point scale than study subjects who saw a
lighter-skinned perpetrator.177 Levinson and Young concluded that simply showing
study subjects a photo of a darker-skinner perpetrator triggered racial bias that
could impact a jury’s evaluation of ambiguous trial evidence as well as jurors’
decisions concerning guilt or innocence. 178 They also determined that racial
stereotypes activated by the photo likely operated outside the participants’
awareness.179
2. Fact Recall
During deliberations, jurors will be called upon to discuss the facts they have
learned. Even the most well-intentioned jurors are likely to experience some routine
memory errors. These errors fall into two categories: forgotten information and
distorted recollections or false memories.180 While memory errors are normal, they
are also “predictable” and “meaningful.”181 A review of relevant research offers
some insight into the predictability and meaningfulness of memory errors where
racial stereotypes are at play.
Just as jurors sometimes fill gaps in the prosecution’s case with stereotyped
fact interpretations, they also tend to fill their own memory gaps with
stereotypes.182 In particular, stereotype consistency plays a significant role in an
individual’s ability to recall information. Researchers have found that people have
172
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less trouble recalling stereotype-consistent information as compared to stereotypeinconsistent information.183 Thus, jurors in a criminal case may have an easier time
remembering a Black defendant’s prior conviction for a violent crime. Levinson
references a study where participants were given scenarios about two
stereotypically White crimes (identity fraud and ecstasy usage), two stereotypically
Black crimes (crack cocaine usage and shoplifting), and two stereotypically neutral
crimes (marijuana usage and joyriding).184 The researchers manipulated the race of
the perpetrator in the scenarios. After reviewing the stories, participants were asked
to recall information about the scenarios and match the race of the perpetrator with
each crime.185 The researchers found that participants had an easier time recalling
the race of the perpetrator when the crime matched the stereotypes associated with
the perpetrator’s racial identity.186 The results showed that “racial stereotypes can
systematically affect jurors[’] (implicit) recollections in the legal setting, and that
jurors may exhibit better recall of information about stereotypical criminals and
crimes.”187
Stereotypes not only affect the facts that jurors recall, but they also play a role
in the development of false memories. Again, stereotype consistency is a major
factor: “Memory scholars have explained that people are more likely to generate
false memories when the contents of these memories are consistent with stereotypes
they have about the subject, actor, and situation of the memory.” 188 In the context
of eyewitness identification, the Blacks-as-criminals stereotype causes White
witnesses to expect Black criminality, and this expectation is so strong that “whites
may observe an interracial scene in which a white person is the aggressor, yet
remember the black person as the aggressor.”189
Levinson conducted a study to test his hypothesis that racial stereotypes can
cause individuals to make memory errors. 190 Study participants were presented
with two unrelated stories. One story described a fistfight and the other described
an employee’s termination.191 The protagonist in each story was White, AfricanAmerican, or Hawaiian.192 After the participants finished their review of the stories,
they completed a questionnaire that was unrelated to the stories. The questionnaire
was intended to eliminate any immediate memories of the stories. After finishing
the questionnaire, study participants answered questions about the stories.193 The
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questions required study subjects to recall aggressive facts, mitigating facts, 194 and
neutral facts from the stories. The questionnaire also asked participants about facts
that were not actually included in the stories.195 Levinson found that participants
misremembered certain facts in racially biased ways.196 In relation to the fistfight
story, he found that participants had an easier time recalling aggressive facts when
the protagonist was African-American as compared to the White protagonist.197 He
also found that participants were more likely to recall false memories of aggressive
action taken by the African-American and Hawaiian protagonists even though the
story did not include these facts. 198 Levinson concluded that implicit memory
biases have a tangible impact on jurors’ decision-making.199
Before turning away from the topic of memory errors, it is important to
consider whether the deliberation process works to solve the problems associated
with forgotten facts and false memories. One might argue that the putting jurors
into a room at the end of trial and allowing them to discuss the facts will cure any
memory errors an individual juror might experience as a result of racial
stereotypes.200 While the deliberation process would likely correct some memory
errors, the effectiveness of process may depend on the jury’s motivations. Nancy
Pennington and Reid Hastie have identified two styles of juries: evidence-driven
juries and verdict-driven juries.201 Evidence-driven juries make an effort to come
to agreement about the facts of the case while verdict-driven juries move directly
to a discussion of the verdict. 202 Pennington and Hastie theorize that evidencedriven juries have a greater opportunity to correct memory errors because they
actually engage in a discussion of the facts. Because verdict-driven juries move
directly to the verdict stage, they are unlikely to identify and correct memory
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errors. 203 Other studies have shown that even evidence-driven juries are not
particularly effective at correcting memory errors. These researchers have
concluded that there is very little support for the assumption that deliberation
improves memory.204 Indeed, several studies have found that “the best predictor of
post-deliberation verdicts is individual jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts.”205
This Section has described the various ways in which racial stereotypes can
affect jurors’ assessments of trial evidence, including character assessment,
credibility assessment, and fact interpretation and recall. The impact of racial
stereotypes is often automatic and subtle, and it may quite difficult to correct the
errors that will result. Because of the significant harm associated with the
application of racial stereotypes, it is imperative that the justice system provide
what George Fisher has deemed front-end quality control to protect against racial
bias.206 I will now turn to a review of the safeguards, as identified by the Supreme
Court, that exist to protect parties, and criminal defendants in particular, from racial
prejudice that is “odious in all respects” and “especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.”207
II. CURRENT METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING RACIAL BIAS AMONG
JURORS
In early 2017, the Supreme Court reaffirmed previously recognized methods
for identifying racially biased jurors and added a new one. In Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, two teenage sisters accused the defendant of sexual assault.208 The state
charged the defendant with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted
sexual assault of a child.209 Prior to the start of the trial, prospective jurors were
asked if they believed they could be fair and impartial in the case. Additionally,
they were provided with a written questionnaire, which asked if there was “anything
about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror.”210 The
trial judge and defense counsel asked the prospective jurors whether they could be
fair and impartial, and the court encouraged jurors to request a private meeting if
they had any concerns about their impartiality. 211 None of the jurors expressed
concerns or reported that they could not be fair and impartial, and no jurors
mentioned that racial bias might impact them.212 After a three-day trial, the jury
203
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found defendant guilty of harassment and unlawful sexual contact, but it did not
reach a verdict on the charge of attempted sexual assault.213
After the trial court discharged the jury, defendant’s counsel met with the jurors
to discuss the trial with them. Once the meeting was over, two jurors remained in
the room to speak privately with defendant’s counsel.214 The two jurors reported
that, during deliberations, another juror had expressed anti-Hispanic bias toward
defendant and his alibi witness.215 With the trial court’s permission, defendant’s
counsel obtained sworn affidavits from the two jurors. They stated that the juror,
identified as Juror H.C., told other jurors that he “believed defendant was guilty
because, in [H.C.’s] experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men
had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with
women.”216 The jurors also reported that Juror H.C. stated, “I think he did it because
he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want,” and that, in his
experience, “nine times out of ten Mexican men are guilty of being aggressive
toward women and young girls.”217 The jurors also attested that Juror H.C. said that
he did not believe defendant’s alibi witness because he was “an illegal.”218
Based on the jurors’ affidavits, defendant moved for a new trial. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion, finding that Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)
prohibited the jurors from testifying regarding the statements that Juror H.C. made
during deliberations. 219 Like Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), Colorado Rule
606(b) limits juror testimony to the following matters: “(1) whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether
there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.”220 The trial court
reasoned that the two jurors’ affidavits failed to satisfy any of these exceptions. The
Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 221 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether evidence of racial bias should
qualify as an additional exception to Rule 606(b)’s no-impeach rule.222
The Court began its analysis by discussing the origins of the no-impeachment
rule; 223 however, for purposes of this Article, the most relevant portion of the
opinion is the Court’s discussion of the five safeguards that are currently in place
to protect against racially biased jury verdicts: (1) voir dire regarding racial bias;
(2) jury instructions on racial bias; (3) observation of juror demeanor and conduct
showing racial bias; (4) juror reports of racially biased comments or conduct during
213
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trial and prior to the start of deliberations; and (5) non-juror reports of racially
biased comments or conduct after trial.224 The Court reviewed these safeguards in
an effort to determine whether they adequately protect a defendant’s right to a fair
and impartial jury, which the Court has recognized as a constitutional guarantee for
both criminal and civil litigants.225 Ultimately, the Court would determine that the
Constitution requires the addition of a sixth safeguard––namely, an additional
exception to Rule 606(b)’s no-impeachment rule that allows trial courts to consider
juror reports of racially biased comments or conduct after trial.226
This Section will focus on voir dire and jury instructions, the two preemptive
safeguards identified by the Court. 227 Despite the Court’s suggestion that these
tools are widely available, an exploration of the relevant case law reveals that
federal and state courts disfavor the use of voir dire and jury instructions to ferret
out racial bias and that, when these tools are used, they are often ineffective.
A. Voir Dire Regarding Racial Bias
The Court has long recognized voir dire as an effective method for protecting
the right to an impartial jury.228 In its 1895 opinion on Connors v. United States,
the Court stated that the questioning of prospective jurors “is permissible in order
to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect
or control the fair determination by him of the issues to be tried.”229 Several of the
Court’s opinions have explored whether it is permissible to question prospective
jurors regarding potential racial bias, and a review of those opinions reveals that
voir dire is not is not always available to parties concerned about potential racial
bias among jurors.
In the 1931 case Aldridge v. United States,230 the defendant, a black man, was
accused of murdering a white police officer and tried in federal district court.231
During voir dire, the defendant’s attorney approached the bench and requested that
the trial judge question the prospective jurors, who were all White, regarding
potential racial prejudice. 232 Defendant’s attorney indicated that he believed the
question to be necessary because during the defendant’s first trial on the murder
224
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charge, one juror indicated that she was influenced by the fact the defendant was
black and the victim white.233 The trial judge refused to ask any questions related
to potential racial bias or prejudice, and ultimately the defendant was convicted.234
The Court found that the trial court erred when it refused to question potential jurors
regarding racial prejudice. 235 After noting that several state courts had already
recognized the propriety of such questions with respect to religion and race, the
Court ruled that it would be a gross injustice to allow an individual to sit on a jury
if his prejudice would prevent him from rendering a fair verdict. 236 Although the
Court acknowledged the government’s argument that allowing voir dire regarding
racial bias would be disruptive to the court system, it stated that “it would be far
more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying
prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the
fact of disqualification were barred.”237
The Court addressed the constitutionality of a trial court’s refusal to allow voir
dire concerning racial bias in Ham v. South Carolina.238 In Ham, the state charged
a black civil rights activist with possession of marijuana. 239 At trial, defendant
requested that the judge conduct voir dire related to the potential jurors’ racial bias
against Blacks. 240 The trial court refused to ask these questions. 241 The jury
convicted the defendant, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months’
confinement.242 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s refusal to ask
the racial bias questions resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights, and the
Supreme Court agreed. 243 First, the Court distinguished Aldridge because it
addressed voir dire inquiry in the federal court system rather than the state court
system. 244 In Aldridge, the Court relied upon its supervisory authority over the
federal courts, rather than the Constitution, in finding that the trial court should
have conducted voir dire inquiry regarding racial bias.245 In spite of this distinction,
the Ham Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
233
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required the trial court to make an inquiry concerning racial bias once the defendant
raised the issue.246 The Court noted that the trial court maintains discretion as to the
form and number of the questions. 247 While the holdings of Aldridge and Ham
appear to answer the question of whether voir dire inquiry regarding racial bias is
not only permissible but required pursuant to the Constitution, the Court would
narrow the applicability of these rulings over the next several years.
About three years after its decision in Ham, the Court limited its applicability
in Ristaino, et al., v. Ross.248 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts charged James
Ross, Jr. and two other African-Americans with armed robbery, assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to murder.249
The victim of Ross’ alleged crimes was a white security guard employed by Boston
University.250 During voir dire, all three defendants requested that the trial judge
ask potential jurors about racial prejudice as well as their affiliations with law
enforcement agencies.251 When the judge inquired about why such questions were
necessary, counsel for one of Ross’ co-defendants stated that inquiry concerning
racial bias was necessary because the defendants were Black and the victim
White. 252 The trial judge denied the defendants’ request that he question the
potential jurors regarding racial prejudice but agreed to question them regarding
any affiliation with law enforcement. 253 The judge also individually questioned
potential jurors about their impartiality. The trial court excused eighteen individuals
based on their responses, including one potential juror who admitted a racial bias.254
Following trial, all three defendants were convicted on all counts, and Ross argued
on appeal that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to question
the venire regarding racial prejudice.255 The Court found no error in the trial court’s
decision, holding that Ham did not establish a blanket constitutional requirement
that trial courts allow voir dire regarding racial bias in all criminal cases involving
Black defendants.256 Instead, the Ristaino Court ruled that the trial court’s decision
must be based on facts specific to the case. It noted that in Ham, the defendant’s
argument that he was framed as a result of his work as a civil rights activist as well
as his reputation as a civil rights activist demonstrated that the issue of race was
“inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.”257 The Court found that these
“special factors” or “racial factors” were not present in Ross’ case, stating that
“[t]he circumstances [ ] did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice
246
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might infect Ross’ trial.”258 Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the majority
opinion in Ristaino left Ham “stillborn” and demonstrated that the promises of Ham
and Aldridge would remain unfulfilled.259
The Court would go on to establish additional limitations on a criminal
defendant’s right to request or conduct voir dire regarding racial bias. For example,
in Turner v. Murray, the Court echoed the holding of Ristaino in finding that
interracial violence on its own is not a “special circumstance” that would trigger a
state trial court’s obligation to permit voir dire regarding potential jurors’ racial
bias;260 however, the Court found that where the defendant has been accused of a
capital offense against a member of another race, the defendant has the right to
request that prospective jurors be informed of the race of the victim and questioned
regarding their potential racial biases.261 The Court reasoned that capital defendants
are entitled to this additional constitutional protection due to the jury’s role in
capital sentencing:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to
operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror who
believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might well be
influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved
the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. . . . More subtle, less
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in
this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent
facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to favor the death
penalty.262
The Turner Court was quite insightful in that it recognized the risk that implicit
racial bias could impact jurors’ decisions; however, the majority’s focus on the
sentencing phase of capital cases confirmed that voir dire may not be available to
other criminal defendants who are concerned about the impact of jurors’ racial
biases.263 In his partial concurrence and dissent, Justice Brennan argued that “the
constitutional right of a defendant to have a trial judge ask the members of the
venire questions concerning possible racial bias is triggered whenever a violent
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interracial crime has been committed.”264 Although the Court recognized the value
of voir dire under such circumstances in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, it limited
its ruling to the federal courts, finding that the Court’s supervisory authority over
the federal courts, rather than the Constitution, called for federal trial courts to
inquire about racial bias when a defendant is accused of committing a violent crime
against a member of another race.265
The Court’s stated limitations on the use of voir dire concerning racial bias
have left many criminal defendants unprotected. For example, in Rosales-Lopez,
the Court found no reversible error in the trial judge’s decision to disallow voir dire
concerning racial bias even though a Mexican defendant was accused of helping
three other Mexican immigrants gain illegal entry into the United States.266 Counsel
for Rosales-Lopez requested that the trial judge allow him to pose the following
question to the venire: “Would you consider the race or Mexican descent of
Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of this case? How would it affect
you?”267 The trial judge refused to ask this question and instead posed the following
two questions to the venire: “Do any of you have any feelings about the alien
problem at all?” and “Do any of you have any particular feelings one way or the
other about aliens or could you sit as a fair and impartial juror if you are called upon
to do so?”268 The difference between the question proposed by counsel for RosalesLopez and the questions asked by the trial judge is significant. While the questions
asked by the judge explicitly mention “aliens” and the “alien problem,” the question
proposed by counsel squarely identified Rosales-Lopez’s race and ethnicity and
asked potential jurors to consider whether racial or ethnic bias against individuals
of Mexican descent might impact them. The Supreme Court ruled that the
defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated by the trial judge’s decision
because there were no “special circumstances” present that would require voir dire
regarding racial bias. 269 Moreover, the Court found that it need not exercise its
supervisory authority over the federal trial court to require voir dire in this case
because the crime was victimless and nonviolent.270 The Rosales-Lopez analysis
was a significant departure from Ham, when the Court found that voir dire on racial
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bias with constitutionally required in a non-violent, victimless marijuana
possession case simply because the defendant was a civil rights activist.271
Federal and state courts have imposed limitations on voir dire concerning
racial bias in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. While courts have
required such inquiry in cases involving interracial violence, 272 they have not
required voir dire regarding racial bias in cases of intraracial violence, including
capital cases, despite the risk that jurors could rely upon racial stereotypes in
making their decision.273 Indeed, even when the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that
it could not understand a trial judge’s reasons for not allowing a very brief inquiry
regarding a predominantly white venire’s racial bias in a federal case when a black
defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine (a non-violent,
victimless crime according to the court),274 the court found no error in the trial
judge’s decision.275
Arguably, the most alarming aspect of the courts’ jurisprudence on voir dire is
the way in which courts handle a venire person who has expressed racial bias. The
Eighth Circuit case of United States v. Ortiz provides an instructive example.276 In
Ortiz, the federal government charged three Black Colombian defendants with
murder, drug trafficking, and traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to
commit murder for hire. 277 The murder victim in the case was of Hispanic
heritage.278 The trial judge asked potential jurors five questions concerning racial
and/or ethnic bias:
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1. “Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more
violent than others? If your answer is yes, please indicate which races
and ethnic groups you believe to be more violent.”
2. “Have you ever had a bad experience involving a person whose race
is different from yours? If your answer is yes, please describe any such
experience.”
3. “How would you feel if a family of a different race moved next door
to you?” Options for answering included “I would favor it,” “I would
be indifferent because the race of my neighbors makes no difference
to me,” and “I would oppose it.”
4. “The defendants in this case are Black and are accused of killing a
Hispanic person. Would the race or ethnicity of the defendants or the
victim be important to you in deciding between a life sentence and the
death penalty?”
5. “Do you have any feelings toward any racial or ethnic group which
would cause you to judge a member of that group differently than you
would judge a member of your own racial or ethnic group?”279
After reviewing the venire’s responses to the questionnaire, the trial court addressed
the panel, informing them that some potential jurors had indicated that they have
had difficulty with people of different races, would oppose having someone of a
different race as a neighbor, and believed that certain races are more violent than
others.280 In an effort to rehabilitate these individuals, the court asked, “Is there
anyone here who expressed such a belief and because of your belief, or for any
other reason, feels that you would be less likely to believe the position of a black
person, or a person from Colombia, as opposed to anyone else merely because of
their race or nationality?” 281 None of the panel members responded to this
question. 282 Later, during the death-penalty qualification for the jurors, the trial
court individually questioned several potential jurors who had made concerning
statements on their questionnaires, but the court did not strike any of them for
cause.283 Thus, even though certain jurors stated that they believed Hispanics and
African-Americans to be more violent than others, they were allowed to remain on
the jury because they stated that the race of the defendants would not affect their
decision.284 The trial court also allowed a juror to remain who indicated that he
believed certain races to be more violent but did not identify any particular race.285
Another juror failed to respond to each of the racial bias questions included in the
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questionnaire.286 The trial court denied defense counsel’s request that these jurors
be subject to additional questioning. 287 The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s handling of these potential jurors.288 Additionally,
because defense counsel used their peremptory strikes to remove several of these
potential jurors, the court determined that the defendants suffered no actual
prejudice.289
The effectiveness of voir dire concerning racial bias, where allowed, varies
depending on the questions that are posed to potential jurors as well as the courts’
willingness to remove those venire persons who express racial bias. If one considers
federal and state courts’ reluctance to allow voir dire regarding racial bias together
with some courts’ refusal to strike potential jurors who admit their prejudices, it
certainly appears that voir dire is not a particularly strong method for ridding juries
of racial bias.
B. Jury Instructions
The Pena-Rodriguez Court identified courts’ instructions to jurors as another
safeguard that protects against racial bias. 290 The Court noted jury instructions
reminding jurors of their duty to make decisions without bias or prejudice are fairly
common as are instructions encouraging jurors to engage in active deliberation and
consultation with their fellow jurors. 291 In his dissent to the majority opinion,
Justice Alito expressed his belief that jury instructions can effectively prevent bias
from impacting a jury’s verdict.292
Although the Pena-Rodriguez Court found value in jury instructions that
mention bias generally,293 lower courts are quite reluctant to allow instructions that
specifically mention racial bias or provide guidance to jurors on the ways in which
they can avoid making a racially biased decision. In United States v. Diaz-Arias,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court’s refusal to allow
the defendant’s proposed racial bias instruction. 294 There, the defendant was
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charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine.295 At trial, he requested that the trial
judge provide the jury with the following instruction: “It would be improper for
you to consider, in reaching your decision as to whether the government sustained
its burden of proof, any personal feelings you may about the defendant’s race or
ethnicity, or national origin, or his or any witness’ immigration status.”296 The trial
judge refused to give defendant’s proposed instruction and instead opted to give a
more general instruction concerning bias:
You should determine what facts have been shown or not based solely on
a fair consideration of the evidence. That proposition means two things,
of course. First of all, you’ll be completely fair-minded and impartial,
swayed neither by prejudice, nor sympathy, by personal likes or dislikes
toward anybody involved in the case, but simply to fairly and impartially
judge the evidence and what it means.297
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court’s instruction was inadequate in
that it did not address the prevalence of stereotypes linking Hispanics with drug
trafficking. 298 Defendant also argued that an instruction specifically mentioning
race or ethnicity was necessary given that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely
than Whites to be imprisoned for drug-related crimes. Defendant claimed that an
instruction specifically mentioning race or ethnicity was necessary “to dispel any
notion among the jurors that being Hispanic in and of itself is evidence of guilt in
a drug crime.”299 The First Circuit disagreed, finding that the trial judge’s general
instruction on prejudice and impartiality sufficiently addressed the concerns raised
by the defendant.300 The court noted that defendant offered no evidence that the
jurors hearing his case harbored any sort of bias against him, and the court refused
to presume that racial bias exists generally. 301 The court also noted that the
defendant was allowed to address his concerns by conducting voir dire regarding
race, ethnicity, national origin, and immigration status.302 Because Diaz-Arias did
not uncover evidence of actual bias among his jurors, the court ruled that he was
not entitled to a jury instruction specifically addressing racial and ethnic bias.303 In
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essence, the First Circuit did not allow the defendant to utilize the safeguard of juror
instruction because he did not already possess evidence of racial bias among his
jurors.
The Diaz-Arias outcome is not limited to federal courts. Two recent state
supreme court cases highlight the difficulties defendants face when they attempt to
introduce race-specific instructions to jurors in an effort to educate them regarding
the prevalence of racial bias. In State v. Plain, the defendant, an African-American,
was charged with one count of harassment in the first degree.304 The alleged victims
of the defendant’s crime were his two Caucasian neighbors. 305 At trial, the
defendant requested that the trial judge provide the following instruction to the jury:
Reach your verdict without discrimination. In reaching your verdict, you
must not consider the defendant’s race, color, religious beliefs, national
origin, or sex. You are not to return a verdict for or against the defendant
unless you would return the same verdict without regard to his race, color,
religious belief, national origin, or sex.306
The trial court refused to give defendant’s proposed instruction because it was not
included in the Iowa State Bar Associations’ model instructions.307 Even though
the Iowa Supreme Court found that defendant’s proposed instruction correctly
stated the law, it found no prejudicial error the trial court’s refusal to utilize the
instruction.308 The court found that the instruction would have been permitted under
Iowa law even though it was not included in the model instructions; however, the
trial court was not required to give the instruction. 309 Moreover, because the
government offered strong evidence of defendant’s guilt, the court found that he
was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction. 310 The court
acknowledged that judges must play a role in eradicating implicit bias in the justice
system and encouraged lower courts to give instructions like the one proposed by
defendant, but the court rejected the idea that it should order a specific process for
addressing implicit bias.311
The Kansas Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in State v. Nesbitt.312
Nesbitt, an African-American man, was charged with felony murder, rape, and
where he directed jury that it should “not allow sympathy or prejudice to influence you. The law
demands of you a just verdict, unaffected by anything except the evidence, your common sense, and
the law as I give it to you.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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aggravated battery, and his alleged victim was a 100-year-old White woman.313 At
the close of all evidence at trial, the defendant requested that the trial judge give a
“race switching” instruction to the jury. The proposed instruction cautioned the
jurors against relying on racial stereotypes when making their decision and stated
that doing so would violate the defendant’s rights.314 The instruction also directed
the jury to engage in a race-switching exercise to determine whether their analysis
of the case was impacted by implicit bias:
To ensure that you have not made any unfair assessments based on racial
stereotypes, you should apply a race-switching instruction exercise to test
whether stereotypes have affected your evaluation of the case. “Race
Switching” involves imagining the same events, the same circumstances,
the same people, but switching the races of the particular witnesses. For
example if the accused is African-American and the accuser/victim is
white, you should imagine a White accused and a black accuser/victim.
If your evaluation of the case is different after engaging in race-switching,
this suggests a subconscious reliance on stereotypes. You must then
reevaluate the case from a neutral, unbiased perspective.315
The trial court refused to provide the instruction to the jury.316 Ultimately, the jury
found defendant guilty on all three counts.317 On appeal, defendant argued that the
trial court erred in refusing to give the race-switching instruction.318 The Kansas
Supreme Court noted that federal law requires that the trial judge provide a racial
bias instruction to capital sentencing juries. 319 The Court stated, however, that
outside the context of federal death penalty cases, state and federal courts have been
very reluctant to instruct juries concerning racial bias. 320 In the end, the Court
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction to the jury because it
unlawfully called for the jury to imagine a hypothetical set of facts that was not
before the jury.321 According to the Court, “Kansas juries have a singular function:
Deciding cases only on evidence actually and validly presented to them. They are
313
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not to imagine another set of facts and then allow that imagination to affect their
deliberations.” 322 Finally, the Nesbitt Court noted that voir dire provides an
opportunity for both parties to explore potential jurors’ racial biases and encourage
them to consider the possibility that they might harbor subconscious biases.323
Despite many courts’ reluctance to instruct juries on racial bias, some state
courts or court-commissioned committees have published model jury instructions
that caution jurors to avoid identity-based bias, including racial bias, in making
their decisions.324 Interestingly, some jurisdictions offer civil jury instructions that
address racial bias but have not crafted equivalent instructions for criminal cases
where a defendant’s freedom is a stake.325
As attorneys and judges have become more familiar with the concept of
implicit bias and way in which it could impact jurors, some states have developed
jury instructions that specifically address implicit bias. For example, the
Pennsylvania Bar Institute’s model civil jury instruction on bias states:
Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of
other people. We may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not
share them with others. We may not be fully aware of some of our other
biases. Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably,
toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what
we see and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make
important decisions.326
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The instruction goes on to instruct jurors that they must not allow bias to influence
their decision.327 Like Oklahoma, Pennsylvania does not offer an equivalent bias
instruction for criminal cases.328
Washington State’s pattern civil instructions also address implicit bias. After
directing jurors to make their decision without relying on “conscious biases” and
listing the various types of biases that might impact jurors,329 Washington’s pattern
introductory instruction to juries states:
[T]here is another more subtle tendency at work that we must all be aware
of. This part of human nature is understandable but must play no role in
your service as jurors. In our daily lives, there are many issues that require
us to make quick decisions and then move on. In making these daily
decisions, we may well rely upon generalities, even what might be called
biases or prejudices. That may be appropriate as a coping mechanism in
our busy daily lives but bias and prejudice can play no part in any decisions
you might make as a juror. Your decisions as jurors must be based solely
upon an open-minded, fair consideration of the evidence that comes before
you during trial.330
In the comments following this instruction, the drafters acknowledge the
detrimental impact that racial bias can have on the administration of justice and
indicate their intention to define both conscious and unconscious bias for
Washington State juries. 331 While the drafters’ goal is laudable, the pattern of
addressing implicit bias solely in civil jury instructions continues. Washington
Id. (“You must not be biased in favor of or against any party or witness because of his or her
disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin [or]
socioeconomic status [, or [insert any other impermissible form of bias]].”).
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State’s pattern criminal instructions provide no information on conscious versus
subconscious bias, and no instructions list the types of biases a juror might harbor
unknowingly.332
At the federal level, the availability of racial bias or implicit bias instructions
varies by jurisdiction. In the federal district court for the Western District of
Washington, parties to criminal actions have access to a set of instructions that
define conscious and unconscious bias in various model instructions, including a
preliminary instruction, a witness credibility instruction, and a closing
instruction.333 The district court also produced a ten minute video that educates
jurors on unconscious bias.334 Similarly, the Honorable Mark W. Bennett, a judge
in the Northern District of Iowa and a preeminent scholar on the topic of implicit
bias in the courtroom,335 provides the following implicit bias instruction to each of
his juries:
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we discussed in jury
selection, everyone, including me, has feelings, assumptions, perceptions,
fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we may not be aware
of. These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear, how we
remember what we see and hear, and how we make important decisions.
Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I strongly
encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to
conclusions based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut
feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law demands
that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your individual
evaluation of that evidence, your reason and common sense, and these
instructions. Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair
decision based on the evidence, not on biases. 336
While Judge Bennett and other federal judges should be commended for their
efforts to raise jurors’ awareness on the issue of implicit bias, jurors’ accessibility
to this information is very dependent upon the trial judge’s willingness to mention
332
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bias. The model criminal jury instructions published by the federal circuit courts
mention bias briefly if at all and do not mention implicit bias or stereotypes, thus
leaving to trial judges the discretion to introduce these topics to jurors.337
In this Section, I have explored the barriers that will welcome any criminal
defendant who seeks to ferret out racial bias by utilizing the two preemptive
safeguards identified by the Pena-Rodriguez Court. The tools of voir dire and jury
instructions are available to most defendants only at the whim of the trial judge,
and the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request will be largely insulated from
appellate review. In order for these safeguards to provide the protection described
in Pena-Rodriguez, trial courts must demonstrate more openness to the possibility
that most jurors enter the courtroom with some sort of bias. Additionally, courts
must adopt a new way of educating jurors about their biases. To be effective, these
changes must be grounded in the truth.
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III. HOW TO TELL THE TRUTH IN THE COURTROOM
The process of truth and reconciliation can help us tell the truth in the American
courtroom. Truth and reconciliation commissions assist communities in raising
awareness of past injustices, providing recognition and closure for victims and
other community members. 338 Truth and reconciliation commissions engage in
community healing by exposing facts and acknowledging past wrongs. 339
Additionally, these commissions sometimes “assist in the creation of well-informed
policies and can provide a step towards social equity for previously victimized
populations.”340 Comparing the truths exposed during South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation process with the truths exposed during court proceedings, Albie
Sachs, a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa opined that the truth
and reconciliation process was far superior:
So little truth comes out of court hearings––truth on which you can
confidently rely. So much truth came pouring out of the Truth
Commission, you would think due process of law is a greater
guarantee of truth than the very open proceedings of the TRC, but it
was the other way around. There was a veracity, an honesty, an
integrity when you just heard the people speaking, and they weren't
speaking to denounce somebody in the defendant's dock, or to get
more money; they were speaking simply to relieve themselves of the
pain. But also there was the corroboration from the mouths of the
perpetrators themselves, truth from two sides. And it worried me at
first, as a lawyer, a judge, that due process seemed to reveal so little
truth while these other processes without strict regulation were so
productive of truth.341
Justice Sachs’ description of the truth and reconciliation process, a process where
participants are driven by their desire for acknowledgment and healing, leaves me
wondering how we can bring the same sense of righteousness to our adversarial
justice system, where the desire, even the need, to win will certainly discourage the
telling of the truth.
I believe that the best way to introduce the American courtroom to the truth
about our tendency to traffic in racial bias is to make race salient at trial. For many
years, social scientists and legal scholars have argued that the open
acknowledgement of race at trial can reduce the likelihood of racial bias. In one
study, Sommers and Ellsworth found that an explicit mention of race significantly
impacted White mock jurors in that they were equally likely to vote to convict the
338
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mock defendant regardless of race. 342 On the other hand, when race was not
mentioned, the White mock jurors were more likely to convict and give longer
sentence recommendations to the Black defendant. 343 Sommers and Ellsworth
found that White jurors in non-race-salient situations are also more likely to
perceive Black defendants as more violent as compared to White defendants and to
perceive White defendants as more honest and moral. 344 These differences in
perception disappeared when race was made salient. 345 Sommers and Ellsworth
concluded that there is sufficient support for their theory that White juror bias is
more likely to occur in trials where racial issues are not salient.346 Lee argues that
race salience impacts jurors because “most Americans will try to avoid appearing
racist in situations when it would be obvious to others that they are acting in a
racially biased manner.”347 When race is made salient, jurors are reminded that they
could be perceived as racist, and they are more likely to make decisions in
accordance with their principles. 348 Lee notes that making race salient is doing
something more than identifying the races of the parties: “Race salience means
making jurors aware of racial issues that can bias their decisionmaking, like the
operation of racial stereotypes.”349
If race salience can move us toward the truth described by Justice Sachs, what
practical changes must our justice system make to allow for an open discussion of
racial bias and stereotypes in the courtroom? First and foremost, trial judges must
better educate themselves on the prevalence and impact of racial bias and
stereotypes among jurors. As Section II describes, a trial judge can choose to shut
down all discussion of racial bias, and appellate courts will overturn that decision
only in very limited circumstances. The move toward mentioning implicit or
unconscious bias in jury instructions signals that courts are willing to allow for
more discussion of racial bias in the courtroom; however, until access to the
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safeguards of voir dire and jury instructions does not vary depending on the
individual judge, we will not see a system-wide reduction in jurors’ reliance on
racial stereotypes.
Looking to specific methods for raising the topic of racial bias during trial, trial
courts must also consider allowing for an open discussion of racial stereotypes by
attorneys. I am not proposing attorney argument similar to the explicit appeals to
racial prejudice that were common in the past.350 Instead, attorneys would have
leeway to discuss stereotypes with the jury subject to the objections of opposing
counsel. Allowing for counsel to speak openly about stereotypes in court will give
defendants some recourse when prosecutors engage in subtle, subconscious
priming of jurors.351 Additionally, in cases where race should be made salient in
the trial or where a race-switching exercise might change the jury’s assessment of
the case, attorneys should be allowed to discuss racial bias during opening
statements and closing arguments. Legal scholars have explored very detailed
methods for countering implicit bias through narrative,352 so I will not spend more
time on this method. Instead, this Section will explore my ideas for changes that
could occur during voir dire and in jury instructions.
A. An Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes During Voir Dire
In Section II.A., I discussed the courts’ reluctance to allow voir dire regarding
racial bias as well as some courts’ unwillingness to dismiss potential jurors who
express racial bias. I disagree with the constraints the courts have placed on
minority defendants in criminal cases353 and believe these defendants should have
the ability to pose voir dire questions regarding racial bias even if the special
circumstances described by the Supreme Court have not been met. 354 Because the
Court has not ruled that criminal defendants of color have a blanket right to conduct
voir dire regarding racial bias, we are left with a hit or miss system that may or may
not allow for such inquiry. To be sure, there are risks associated with conducting
voir dire regarding racial bias. An attorney may determine that not inquiring about
racial bias is the best plan of action for his or her client.355 Thus, the decision should
lie with defendants and their counsel.
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If a defendant decides to conduct voir dire regarding racial bias, then defense
counsel must proceed carefully. Asking the jurors if they are racists in open court
is likely to backfire.356 Inquiry through individual questionnaires is likely a better
method. The questionnaire that the trial court provided to the venire in United States
v. Ortiz included questions that made race salient while also demanding that
potential jurors do more than merely deny that they are racists.357 The questionnaire
included the following helpful questions:
1. “Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more violent
than others? If your answer is yes, please indicate which races and ethnic
groups you believe to be more violent.”
2. “Have you ever had a bad experience involving a person whose race is
different from yours? If your answer is yes, please describe any such
experience.”
3. “How would you feel if a family of a different race moved next door to
you?” Options for answering included “I would favor it,” “I would be
indifferent because the race of my neighbors makes no difference to me,”
and “I would oppose it.”358
I believe this questionnaire can be expanded to include questions that inquire about
stereotypes commonly attributed to the parties in the case. For example, in a rape
case where a Black defendant is accused of raping a White woman and the
defendant asserts consent as his defense, it would appropriate to inquire regarding
the venire’s beliefs about interracial sex:
“How would you feel if one of your female family members married
[or had sex with] an individual of a different race?” Options for
answering would include “I would favor it,” “I would be indifferent
because the race of family member’s spouse [sexual partner] makes
no difference to me,” and “I would oppose it.”
Another appropriate question for the rape case would be:

entirely defensible as a matter of strategy.”). See also U.S. v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 n. 5 (1st Cir.
2009) (“[M]any defense attorneys have sound tactical reasons for not proposing specific voir dire
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raising an issue defense counsel does not want to highlight.”).
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“Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more
likely to commit rape? If your answer is yes, please indicate which
races and ethnic groups you believe more likely to commit rape.”
In a case where an individual of Arab descent is charged with criminal terrorist
activity, an appropriate question would be:
“Do you believe that certain races or ethnic groups tend to be more
likely to engage in terrorism? If your answer is yes, please indicate
which races and ethnic groups you believe more likely to engage in
terrorism.”
These questions are valuable not only because they may assist the court in
identifying biased jurors but also because they will remind low-prejudiced or nonprejudiced individuals of their values, thereby reducing the likelihood that those
jurors will rely on racial stereotypes.359
The most important aspect of my proposal on voir dire concerns the trial
judge’s approach for handling a prospective juror who openly admits bias. The trial
judge in Ortiz did not require all potential jurors to complete the questionnaire and
attempted to rehabilitate the individuals who disclosed their bias by asking the
entire panel whether their beliefs would impact their ability to “believe the
position” of a person because of their race.360 None of the panelists responded to
this question. During the death penalty phase of the trial, the trial judge met with
several potential jurors who had disclosed their biases, but the judge did not strike
any of them from the panel. 361 To make matters worse, the judge did not allow
defense counsel to conduct follow-up inquiry with the panelists who disclosed their
biases or failed to complete the questionnaire.362 Ultimately, defense counsel was
forced to use peremptory strikes to remove several of these potential jurors.
Under my proposal, potential jurors who disclose their belief in racial
stereotypes would be struck for cause unless they can properly rehabilitate
themselves. The trial judge in Ortiz attempted to rehabilitate biased jurors with a
single question about their ability to be fair, but no “magic question” can ensure
that biased jurors will not rely on their biases.363 While I am not opposed to the trial
judge and counsel engaging in further inquiry with such jurors, the trial court should
359
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presume that they will be struck for cause unless they are able to rehabilitate
themselves to the satisfaction of the court and counsel.
B. An Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes in Jury Instructions
Like voir dire questioning, jury instructions on racial bias and stereotypes
should be available whenever requested by minority defendants in criminal cases.
Additionally, I disagree with the Kansas Supreme Court’s determination that a raceswitching instruction, which asks jurors to switch the races of the parties to ensure
that bias has not affected their decision, is an improper hypothetical. 364 My
proposals regarding jury instructions build upon the work of courts and jury
instruction committees who routinely educate jurors about the prevalence of
implicit bias.365 While some of these proposed instructions do not mention race
specifically, 366 others make race salient by explicitly identifying widely known
stereotypes and educating jurors on the specific ways in which stereotypes can
impact their work as jurors.
1. Life Experiences Instruction
Current instructions encourage jurors to use their life experiences and
common sense to assess trial evidence, but doing so may necessarily involve the
application of stereotypes.367 Modeled after New York’s Pattern Civil Instruction
on jurors’ use of professional expertise,368 my proposed instruction states:
Although as jurors you are encouraged to use all of your life
experiences and common sense when analyzing trial evidence and
reaching a fair verdict, you must understand that it is unfair to make
decisions based on assumptions or stereotypes about people who are
different from you. If your life experiences include stereotypes
about people who are different from you, you must not rely on those
experiences.
Even though this instruction is brief and does not specifically address racial bias, it
364
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provides an important reminder that jurors should not rely too heavily on their
personal experiences.
2. Instruction on Stereotypes
My proposed instruction on stereotypes reflects well-settled research on the impact
that racial bias can have on jurors. It incorporates the Pennsylvania Bar Institute’s
model civil jury instruction on bias and provides more information on stereotypes:
369

Each one of us has biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of
other people. We may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not
share them with others. We may not be fully aware of some of our other
biases.
Our biases often affect how we act, favorably or unfavorably, toward
someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we see
and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make important
decisions. Bias and stereotypes can cause us: (1) to be skeptical of people
who are different from us; (2) to remember information that is consistent
with stereotypes and forget information that is inconsistent with
stereotypes; and (3) to fill any evidence gaps with stereotypes. Stereotypes
can also cause us to more easily believe witnesses who are like us.
As jurors you are being asked to make very important decisions in this
case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or public opinion influence your
decision. You must not be biased in favor of or against any party or witness
because of his or her disability, gender, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, age, national origin, [or] socioeconomic status [, or [insert any
other impermissible form of bias]].
Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented. You must
not use stereotypes as evidence. You must carefully evaluate the evidence
and resist any urge to reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or
against any party or witness.
This instruction builds upon a very effective instruction on bias and provides jurors
with some additional education regarding stereotypes. Unlike the Pennsylvania
instruction, this proposed instruction would be available to all criminal defendants
who seek an instruction on bias.
369
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3. Instruction on Specific Racial Stereotypes
It is quite risky to introduce specific racial stereotypes to jurors who would
have been unaware of them otherwise. One might argue that planting the seeds of
prejudice where they do not already exist would be incredibly harmful to my
ultimate goal of eliminating racial bias in the justice system. The decision to
introduce specific stereotypes to the jury in an effort to make them salient must rest
with defendants and defense counsel. In making this decision, they should consider
whether the jury has already been primed with racial stereotypes. 370 Carodine
argues that whenever a Black defendant enter the courtroom, his or her race will be
relevant: “[T]hat is, race has a tendency to prove or disprove something in the
American justice system just as it does in society at large. Race is indeed evidence
and is automatically admissible, as we do not shield a person's race from the
jury.”371
This Article has identified many commonly held stereotypes that could come
into play during a criminal trial, but the list is certainly not exhaustive. 372
Attempting to draft a list of stereotypes is risky as well, for “jurors might think it
appropriate to rely on [any] omitted stereotype.” 373 Nevertheless, I believe that
openly identifying certain widely known stereotypes will help jurors who want to
identify and reject racial stereotypes. Where an attorney is concerned that certain
stereotypes might impact the jury, he or she would identify the stereotypes of
concern and draft an instruction using the model proposed below.
The first example of the Specific Racial Stereotypes Instruction utilizes the
stereotype concerns present in Pena-Rodriguez. Defendant, a Latino man, was on
trial for sexual assault of a child.374 As Pena-Rodriguez’s attorney, I would have
been concerned about the Latinos as criminally inclined and Latinos as violent
stereotypes. Another stereotype about Latino “machismo” would have been
relevant as well.375 The proposed instruction states:
Defendant, a Latino man [or man of Mexican heritage], has been
charged with harassment, unlawful sexual contact, and attempted
Levinson and Young, supra note 83, at 327 (stating that stereotypes are activated “easily,
automatically, and often unconsciously”).
371
Carodine, supra note 37, at 567.
372
See Section I, supra (identifying the following stereotypes: Blacks as criminally inclined,
animalistic, violent, sexually unrestrained, dishonest, hostile, angry, and unintelligent; Latinos as
undocumented, foreign, criminally inclined, and violent; Arabs as terrorists; Asians as foreigners,
martial artists, and model minorities; and people of color in general as lazy, incompetent, disloyal,
unpatriotic, and willing to lie for each other).
373
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sexual assault of a child. One of the unfortunate truths about our
great country is that many of us make unfair judgments about others,
especially people who do not share our race or ethnicity. In this case,
there is a risk that you will assess the evidence offered in this case
and make your decision based on widely known but untrue
stereotypes about Latino men and criminal or violent conduct. It
would violate the core principles of our justice system to allow these
stereotypes to impact you. I implore you to resist any urge to reach
a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party or witness
and to make your decision based solely on the evidence presented.
This proposed instruction truthfully explains individuals’ tendency to rely on
stereotypes, informs jurors of the risk that stereotypes could impact them, and urges
them to avoid applying the stereotypes. This instruction explicitly identifies the
stereotypes but moves quickly to a firm statement that they are untrue. This
instruction makes race and the relevant stereotypes salient for jury but leaves no
room for them to assume that the court supports any sort of reliance on the
stereotypes.
The second example of the Specific Racial Stereotypes Instruction uses the
same form as the first but the statement is modified based on the stereotype of
concern. The second example uses a different stereotype concern from PenaRodriguez that relates to defendant’s alibi witness, who was Latino and purportedly
undocumented. 376 As Pena-Rodriguez’s attorney, I would be concerned that the
jury would apply certain stereotypes when assessing the witness’ credibility,
including the stereotype that people of color are willing to lie for each other and the
stereotype that undocumented immigrants are dishonest. Even though the concern
regarding immigration status does not explicitly implicate race, our country has
made Latin ethnicity a proxy for undocumented immigration status. 377 The
instruction states:
One of Defendant’s witnesses, [insert name] is also a Latino man [or
man of Mexican heritage], and he is an undocumented immigrant.
One of the unfortunate truths about our great country is that many
of us make unfair judgments about others, especially people who do
not share our race or ethnicity. In this case, there is a risk that you
will assess this witness’ testimony based on widely known but
untrue stereotypes about Latino immigrants [or undocumented
immigrants] and dishonesty as well as untrue stereotypes about the
willingness of people of color to lie for each other. It would violate
376
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the core principles of our justice system to allow these stereotypes
to impact you. I implore you to resist any urge to assess testimony
or reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party
or witness and to make your decision based solely on the evidence
presented.
This proposed instruction focuses specifically on witness credibility and the impact
of racial stereotypes in this area. The final two sentences of the instruction are
nearly identical to the first example.
The final example of the Specific Racial Stereotype Instruction would have
been helpful for the prosecution in State v. Zimmerman trial.378 While this Article
has focused exclusively on criminal defendants’ right to question and educate jurors
on racial bias and stereotypes, the Zimmerman trial reminds us that racial
stereotypes can run rampant in self-defense cases involving victims of color. An
instruction regarding the stereotypes of concern would have been helpful for the
Zimmerman jury in light of the testimony of Rachel Jeantel. The stereotypes at play
were the Blacks as unintelligent, Blacks as hostile, and Blacks as liars stereotypes.
The instruction states:
One of prosecution’s witnesses, Rachel Jeantel, is a Black woman
of Haitian descent.379 One of the unfortunate truths about our great
country is that many of us make unfair judgments about others,
especially people who do not share our race or ethnicity. In this case,
there is a risk that you will assess this witness’ testimony based on
widely known but untrue stereotypes about Blacks as being
dishonest, Blacks as being less intelligent than Whites, and Blacks
as being hostile toward others. It would violate the core principles
of our justice system to allow these stereotypes to impact you. I
implore you to resist any urge to assess testimony or reach a verdict
that is influenced by bias for or against any party or witness and to
make your decision based solely on the evidence presented.
This instruction would be most helpful to the jury at the close of all evidence as the
issues concerning Ms. Jeantel’s intelligence and purported hostility did not come
to light until her testimony was complete. This instruction explicitly states the
stereotypes at play, making them salient for the jury and discourages the jury from
relying on them.
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CONCLUSION
The proposals contained in this Article are not a magic bullet for the racial bias
problem that has plagued our justice system for years, but as all good Evidence
professors likely remind their students, a brick is not a wall. As McCormick
explains, “Under our system, molded by the tradition of jury trial and
predominantly oral proof, a party offers his evidence not en masse, but item by
item. An item of evidence, being but a single link in the chain of proof, need not
prove conclusively the proposition for which it is offered.”380 Thus, the solutions
proposed in this Article cannot fully solve a problem that has been institutionalized
for centuries. Instead, each scholar, researcher, jurist, and attorney must stand on
the shoulders of the ones who came before them, hoping that they are able to place
a brick in the wall of justice.
To achieve the promises of our great country, it is imperative that we begin by
being honest about our imperfect tendencies. Through truthful acknowledgement
of the ills of the past and the impact those harms continue to have on our country,
we can become the nation described by the majority in Pena-Rodriguez––a nation
that can only move forward by confronting the prejudices that threaten our way of
life.381
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